Knowingly just. Notes on the epistemology of the original position[Savamment juste. Notes sur l'épistémologie de la position originelle]

This paper argues that Rawls' original position entails an improper conception of knowledge and asks whether the impartiality model still keeps its robustness. A view of knowledge as separate and detacheable from (a too independent) mind as it appears in the original position is contrasted with a more constitutive approach in Rawls' first article Outline for a Procedure of Justice. There, the competent juges are intellectual virtuous rather than simple possessors of knowledge. First, I argue that a more constitutive approach is inconsistent with the symetry requirement and even if Rawls implicitly recognizes it in Political Liberalism he will not consequently weaken the original position requirements. Second, a view of a too independent mind is implied by the original position : presented as a guide of reasoning it specifies not only how to conduct our judgement but also which knowledge is permitted to us and which is interdited. But if direct doxastic voluntarism is false the original position could not guide our reasoning in this way. The most important consequence is, if I am right, that the original position could hardly embody the pure procedural justice.