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Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations

Author

Listed:
  • Florian Brandl
  • Dominik Peters

    (LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Approval voting allows every voter to cast a ballot of approved alternatives and chooses the alternatives with the largest number of approvals. Due to its simplicity and superior theoretical properties, it is a serious contender for use in real-world elections. We support this claim by giving eight characterizations of approval voting. All our results involve the consistency axiom, which requires choices to be consistent across different electorates. In addition, we consider strategyproofness, agreement with majority opinions, independence of cloned alternatives, and invariance under removing inferior alternatives. We prove our results by reducing them to a single base theorem, for which we give a simple and intuitive proof.

Suggested Citation

  • Florian Brandl & Dominik Peters, 2022. "Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations," Post-Print hal-03816040, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03816040
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105532
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03816040
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    Cited by:

    1. Chris Dong & Patrick Lederer, 2023. "Refined Characterizations of Approval-based Committee Scoring Rules," Papers 2312.08799, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    2. Susumu Cato & Stéphane Gonzalez & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2022. "Approval voting versus proportional threshold methods: so far and yet so near," Working Papers halshs-03858356, HAL.
    3. Chris Dong & Patrick Lederer, 2023. "Characterizations of Sequential Valuation Rules," Papers 2302.11890, arXiv.org.
    4. Fujun Hou, 2024. "A new social welfare function with a number of desirable properties," Papers 2403.16373, arXiv.org.

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