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Is the newcomer more aggressive when the incumbent is granted a Right-of-First-Refusal in a procurement auction? Experimental Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Karine Brisset

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • François Maréchal

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Francois Cochard

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Karine Brisset & François Maréchal & Francois Cochard, 2015. "Is the newcomer more aggressive when the incumbent is granted a Right-of-First-Refusal in a procurement auction? Experimental Evidence," Post-Print hal-03282278, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03282278
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9438-z
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    Cited by:

    1. Lars Isenhardt & Stefan Seifert & Silke Hüttel, 2023. "Tenant Favoritism and Right of First Refusals in Farmland Auctions: Competition and Price Effects," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 99(2), pages 302-324.
    2. Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Philippe Solal, 2022. "The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(2), pages 431-450, June.
    3. Isenhardt, Lars & Seifert, Stefan & Huettel, Silke, 2021. "On the price effect of a right-of-first-refusal in farmland auctions," 95th Annual Conference, March 29-30, 2021, Warwick, UK (Hybrid) 312053, Agricultural Economics Society - AES.
    4. Christoph March, 2019. "The Behavioral Economics of Artificial Intelligence: Lessons from Experiments with Computer Players," CESifo Working Paper Series 7926, CESifo.
    5. March, Christoph, 2021. "Strategic interactions between humans and artificial intelligence: Lessons from experiments with computer players," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).

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