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Gender Violence and the Price of Virginity: Theory and Evidence of Incomplete Marriage Contracts

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  • Daniel L. Chen

    (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper builds and tests a model of marriage as an incomplete contract that arises from asymmetric virginity premiums and examines whether this can lead to social inefficiencies. Contrary to the efficient households hypothesis, women cannot prevent being appropriated by men once they enter marriage if they command lower marriage market opportunities upon divorce. Because men cannot or do not commit to compensating women for their lower ex post marriage market opportunities, marriage is an incomplete contract. Men may seek to lower women's ex ante "market wages" in order to induce entry into joint production. Inefficient or abusive marriages are less likely to separate. Equalizing virginity premiums may reduce domestic and non-domestic violence.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel L. Chen, 2020. "Gender Violence and the Price of Virginity: Theory and Evidence of Incomplete Marriage Contracts," Post-Print hal-03170620, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03170620
    DOI: 10.1163/2589742X-12347108
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03170620
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Kelly Bedard & Olivier Deschênes, 2005. "Sex Preferences, Marital Dissolution, and the Economic Status of Women," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 40(2).
    6. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 57-82.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Daniel L., 2023. "Judicial compliance in district courts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).

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