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Honesty in environmental compliance games
[Honnêteté et conformité environnementale]

Author

Listed:
  • Philippe Bontems

    (Station d'économie et sociologie rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • G. Rotillon

    (Inconnu)

Abstract

On étudie les conséquences de l'honnêteté dans un jeu de conformité entre une agence environnementale et des firmes polluantes. Deux politiques de contrôle sont examinées, avec ou sans auto-déclaration des firmes en ce qui concerne les rejets polluants. Premièrement, on montre que l'intensité du contrôle (probabilité d'inspection et taille de l'amende espérée) décroît lorsque la proportion de firmes honnêtes augmente. Deuxièmement, le laissez-faire peut être une politique optimale pour l'agence quand la proportion d'honnêtes est suffisamment grande. Troisièmement, sous des conditions peu contraignantes, on montre que la pollution totale augmente avec la proportion d'honnêtes tandis que le bien-être social diminue.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Bontems & G. Rotillon, 2000. "Honesty in environmental compliance games [Honnêteté et conformité environnementale]," Post-Print hal-02685861, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02685861
    as

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    Cited by:

    1. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2014. "Criminalizing environmental offences: when the prosecutor’s helping hand hurts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 199-219, April.
    2. Sverre Grepperud, 2007. "Environmental voluntary behaviour and crowding-out effects: regulation or laissez-faire?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 135-149, April.

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