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Un modèle d'endettement régional avec contrainte budgétaire molle

Author

Listed:
  • Marie-Laure Breuillé

    (Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense)

  • Thierry Madiès

    (UNIFR - Université de Fribourg = University of Fribourg)

  • Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

    (UN - Université de Nantes)

Abstract

In this article, we endogenously derive the soft budget constraint phenomenon in a federation when fiscal decisions are delegated to regions. In this framework, the softness of the regional budget constraint results from federal government cross-subsidization objective. We analyse the impact of the soft budget constraint on the borrowing opportunity cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie-Laure Breuillé & Thierry Madiès & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2006. "Un modèle d'endettement régional avec contrainte budgétaire molle," Post-Print hal-02664987, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02664987
    DOI: 10.3917/reco.573.0553
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-1162, December.
    2. Timothy Goodspeed, 2002. "Bailouts in a Federation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 409-421, August.
    3. János Kornai, 2014. "The soft budget constraint," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 64(supplemen), pages 25-79, November.
    4. J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland, 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 11.
    5. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
    6. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March.
    7. Jonathan A. Rodden & Gunnar S. Eskeland (ed.), 2003. "Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262182297, April.
    8. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    FEDERALISME FINANCIER; BIEN PUBLIC REGIONAL;

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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