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A Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover

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  • Raouf Boucekkine

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IMéRA - Institut d'Etudes Avancées - AMU - Aix Marseille Université)

  • Paolo Piacquadio

    (UiO - University of Oslo)

  • Fabien Prieur

    (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

Abstract

We consider an autocracy where the ruling elite control both the resource wealth and ed- ucation policies. Education prompts economic growth and enriches the budget of the elite. However, education also increases the "awareness of citizens"–capturing their reluctance to accept a dictatorship and their labor market aspirations –and forces the elite to ex- pand redistribution or handover the power. A power handover leads to a more democratic regime, where the elite retains (at least partially) its economic power. This trade-offis the backbone of our Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover. This theory provides new insights on the positive relationship between economic development, education, and de- mocratization, and on the negative relationship between inequality and democratization. Finally, we revisit the resources-curse hypothesis within our setting

Suggested Citation

  • Raouf Boucekkine & Paolo Piacquadio & Fabien Prieur, 2019. "A Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover," Post-Print hal-02370531, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02370531
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.010
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02370531
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    Cited by:

    1. Raouf Boucekkine & Rodolphe Desbordes & Paolo Melindi-Ghidi, 2020. "Education, neopatrimonialism, and revolutions," AMSE Working Papers 2017, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    2. Matata Ponyo Mapon & Jean-Paul K. Tsasa, 2019. "The artefact of the Natural Resources Curse," Papers 1911.09681, arXiv.org.
    3. Ngo Van Long, 2019. "Managing, Inducing, and Preventing Regime Shifts: A Review of the Literature," CESifo Working Paper Series 7749, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lipset’s theory; Resource curse; Institutional change; Human capital;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • I25 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Economic Development
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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