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Caveat preemptor : Coordination Failure and Success in a Duopoly Investment Game

Author

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  • Etienne Billette de Villemeur

    (EQUIPPE - Economie Quantitative, Intégration, Politiques Publiques et Econométrie - Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies - Université de Lille, Sciences Humaines et Sociales - PRES Université Lille Nord de France - Université de Lille, Droit et Santé, Université de Lille)

  • Richard Ruble

    (EM - EMLyon Business School, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bruno Versaevel

    (EM - EMLyon Business School, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We build on Mason and Weeds [10]'s model of duopoly investment under uncertainty by allowing high initial values of the profit shock as in Huisman and Kort [8]. Persistent first-mover advantage increases likelihood of immediate simultaneous investment. In contrast with previous models where these have been interpreted as "mistakes" such simultaneous investment outcomes can be optimal for the industry. Clustering of investments is thus both more likely, and more likely to be a desirable outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Richard Ruble & Bruno Versaevel, 2013. "Caveat preemptor : Coordination Failure and Success in a Duopoly Investment Game," Post-Print hal-02312926, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02312926
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.034
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    Cited by:

    1. Bruno Versaevel, 2015. "Alertness, Leadership, and Nascent Market Dynamics," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 440-466, December.

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