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Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Lubatkin

    (EM - EMLyon Business School)

  • William S. Schulze
  • N Dino Richard

Abstract

Surprisingly, the majority of U.S. family firms offer employed family members short- and long-term performance-based incentive pay. We draw on the household economics and altruism literatures to explain why family firms might feel compelled to do so and develop theory that predicts when this practice will be beneficial. Results based on data obtained from 883 family firms show that altruism, as reflected by the parents' estate and share transfer intentions, moderates the effect of these pay incentives as our theory predicts. As such, this article helps explain both how altruism influences agency relationships in family firms and why business practice in family firms differs from those found in other types of firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Lubatkin & William S. Schulze & N Dino Richard, 2003. "Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms," Post-Print hal-02311679, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02311679
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