A Psychometric Investigation of the Personality Traits Underlying Individual Tax Morale
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Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2018-0149
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02290402
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Other versions of this item:
- Jacquemet Nicolas & Luchini Stéphane & Malézieux Antoine & Shogren Jason F., 2019. "A Psychometric Investigation of the Personality Traits Underlying Individual Tax Morale," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(3), pages 1-25, July.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Antoine Malezieux & Jason Shogren, 2019. "A Psychometric Investigation of the Personality Traits Underlying Individual Tax Morale," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-02290402, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Antoine Malézieux & Jason Shogren, 2019. "A psychometric investigation of the personality traits underlying individual tax morale," Working Papers halshs-02008071, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Antoine Malezieux & Jason Shogren, 2019. "A Psychometric Investigation of the Personality Traits Underlying Individual Tax Morale," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-02290402, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Antoine Malézieux & Jason Shogren, 2019. "A psychometric investigation of the personality traits underlying individual tax morale," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02008071, HAL.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Jacquemet, N. & Luchini, S. & Malézieux, A. & Shogren, J.F., 2020.
"Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Antoine Malezieux & Jason Shogren, 2019. "Who'll stop lying under oath ? Empirical evidence from Tax Evasion Games," Working Papers halshs-02159905, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & A. Malézieux & Jason F. Shogren, 2020. "Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-02576845, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & A. Malézieux & Jason F. Shogren, 2020. "Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games," Post-Print hal-02576845, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Antoine Malezieux & Jason Shogren, 2019. "Who'll stop lying under oath ? Empirical evidence from Tax Evasion Games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02159905, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & A. Malézieux & Jason F. Shogren, 2020. "Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-02576845, HAL.
- Dossè Mawussi Djahini‐Afawoubo, 2024. "Understanding tax payment behaviour in the West African Economic and Monetary Union: The role of perceived detection capacity and honesty," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(2), pages 795-823, March.
- James Alm & Antoine Malézieux, 2021.
"40 years of tax evasion games: a meta-analysis,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(3), pages 699-750, September.
- James Alm & Antoine Malézieux, 2020. "40 Years of Tax Evasion Games: A Meta-Analysis," Working Papers 2004, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Emmanuelle Deglaire & Peter Daly & Fabrice Lec, 2021.
"Exposure to tax dilemmas deteriorate individuals' self-declared tax morale,"
Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 363-397, December.
- Emmanuelle Deglaire & Peter Daly & Fabrice Le Lec, 2021. "Exposure to tax dilemmas deteriorate individuals' self-declared tax morale," Post-Print hal-03593787, HAL.
More about this item
Keywords
tax evasion; tax morale; morality; personality traits; psychometrics;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2019-10-14 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-DCM-2019-10-14 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-EVO-2019-10-14 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2019-10-14 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-IUE-2019-10-14 (Informal and Underground Economics)
- NEP-NEU-2019-10-14 (Neuroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2019-10-14 (Public Economics)
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