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Mickey Mouse and moral hazard : uninformative but correlated triggers

Author

Listed:
  • Neil Doherty

    (Wharton School - University of Pennsylvania)

  • Olivier Mahul

Abstract

Holmström a montré que des signaux peuvent être utilisés pour lutter contre le problème de risque moral si ces signaux additionnels étaient informatifs de l'action de l'agent qui n'est pas directement observable par le principal. De nombreux signaux sont maintenant utilisés dans les nouvelles méthodes de transfert de risque et dans l'élaboration des schémas de récompense des dirigeants d'entreprise. Ils ont alors une fonction opposée à celle énoncée par Holmström : ils ne fournissent aucune information directe sur les décisions des dirigeants, mais ils sont corrélés avec leurs résultats. Les auteurs retravaillent le modèle Principal-Agent pour examiner le rôle de ces signaux. Ils illustrent comment la Oriental land company, propriétaire du parc à thème Disneyland à Tokyo, ainsi que de nombreuses compagnies d'assurance, utilisent de tels signaux.

Suggested Citation

  • Neil Doherty & Olivier Mahul, 2001. "Mickey Mouse and moral hazard : uninformative but correlated triggers," Post-Print hal-01952104, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01952104
    as

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    Cited by:

    1. Darius Lakdawalla & George Zanjani, 2012. "Catastrophe Bonds, Reinsurance, and the Optimal Collateralization of Risk Transfer," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 79(2), pages 449-476, June.
    2. MacMinn, Richard & Richter, Andreas, 2018. "The choice of trigger in an insurance linked security: The mortality risk case," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 174-182.
    3. MacMinn, Richard & Richter, Andreas, 2006. "Hedging Brevity Risk with Mortality-based Securities," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 1219, University of Munich, Munich School of Management.

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