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Demand Uncertainty and Incentives to Share Information in Duopoly
[Incertitude sur la demande et incitations au partage de l'information dans un duopole]

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  • Florent Venayre

    (GDI - Gouvernance et développement insulaire - UPF - Université de la Polynésie Française)

Abstract

We study the incentives to share information in a duopoly when firms can suffer from a lack of information about demand. We show that if the risk of suffering from a lack of information is not too high, the information sharing is always mutually profitable for the firms, regardless of the competition or the nature of the goods. Moreover, we show that the informational behavior of the firms depends on two factors : the kind of demand uncertainty and the assumptions made about information.

Suggested Citation

  • Florent Venayre, 1999. "Demand Uncertainty and Incentives to Share Information in Duopoly [Incertitude sur la demande et incitations au partage de l'information dans un duopole]," Post-Print hal-01889500, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01889500
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01889500
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