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Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe

Author

Listed:
  • Julien Hanoteau

    (GEM - Groupe d'économie mondiale - Sciences Po - Sciences Po, GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Using cross-sector and cross-country data, this paper evidences that rent seeking influenced the allocation of CO 2 emission permits in the two first phases of the European emissions trading scheme. Industry lobbies effectively used the ?job loss? and ?competitiveness? arguments, as unemployment proxy variables significantly impacted the allocation in both phases, and carbon intensity influenced it in the second phase. The countries that adopted a partial auction scheme also gave relatively more permits and in particular to the politically more powerful sectors. This suggests a compensation mechanism and supports the assumption of a political tradeoff between the quantity of permits issued and the decision between free grant and auction. It also confirms that the initial allocation is not neutral in the presence of special interest lobbying. JEL Classification: D72, Q58, C10.

Suggested Citation

  • Julien Hanoteau, 2014. "Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe," Post-Print hal-01474275, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01474275
    DOI: 10.3917/rel.801.0061
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    Cited by:

    1. Joltreau, Eugénie & Sommerfeld, Katrin, 2016. "Why does emissions trading under the EU ETS not affect firms' competitiveness? Empirical findings from the literature," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-062, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    emissions trading; Lobbying; permits allocation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General

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