IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01358365.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Beyond the personal-anonymous divide. Agency relations in powers of attorney in France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

Author

Listed:
  • Fabien Eloire

    (CLERSÉ - Centre Lillois d’Études et de Recherches Sociologiques et Économiques - UMR 8019 - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Claire Lemercier

    (CSO - Centre de sociologie des organisations (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Veronica Aoki Santarosa

    (University of Michigan [Ann Arbor] - University of Michigan System)

Abstract

Powers of attorney are often interpreted as evidence of trust among the parties involved. We build a novel dataset of notarized powers of attorney, capturing a wide variety of agency relationships in four large French commercial cities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to test hypotheses on the relational basis of economic relationships. We find little support for the idea of a radical shift from personal to anonymous relationships during our period. Our results point to more nuanced transformations. The preference for proxies in the same occupation as the principal somewhat declined, while professional proxies emerged and principals used relational chains, especially involving notaries, to find proxies.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabien Eloire & Claire Lemercier & Veronica Aoki Santarosa, 2019. "Beyond the personal-anonymous divide. Agency relations in powers of attorney in France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries," Post-Print hal-01358365, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01358365
    DOI: 10.1111/ehr.12784
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01358365
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01358365/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ehr.12784?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Guinnane Timothy W., 2005. "Trust: A Concept Too Many," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook, De Gruyter, vol. 46(1), pages 77-92, June.
    2. Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521480444, January.
    3. Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, 1990. "The Development of Irrigation in Provence, 1700-1860: The French Revolution and Economic Growth," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 615-638, September.
    4. Santarosa, Veronica Aoki, 2015. "Financing Long-Distance Trade: The Joint Liability Rule and Bills of Exchange in Eighteenth-Century France," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 690-719, September.
    5. Douglass C. North, 2005. "Introduction to Understanding the Process of Economic Change," Introductory Chapters, in: Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton University Press.
    6. Benito Arruñada & Veneta Andonova, 2008. "Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations," Economics Working Papers 1098, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, 1994. "Insider Lending: Banks, Personal Connections, and Economic Development in Industrial New England," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number lamo94-1, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fabien Eloire & Claire Lemercier & Veronica Aoki Santarosa, 2016. "Beyond the personal-anonymous divide: Agency relations in powers of attorney in France, 18th–19th centuries," Working Papers hal-01358365, HAL.
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3v5ra0iula8h5a94g2b8a43cvb is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3v5ra0iula8h5a94g2b8a43cvb is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Fabien Eloire & Claire Lemercier & Veronica Aoki Santarosa, 2019. "Beyond the personal-anonymous divide. Agency relations in powers of attorney in France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01358365, HAL.
    5. Fabien Eloire & Claire Lemercier & Veronica Aoki Santarosa, 2016. "What can we learn about the embeddedness of commercial relationships from the study of powers of attorney?," Working Papers hal-01358364, HAL.
    6. Fabien Eloire & Claire Lemercier & Veronica Aoki Santarosa, 2016. "What can we learn about the embeddedness of commercial relationships from the study of powers of attorney?," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01358364, HAL.
    7. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1qj79hnvh79ggpmoddpe0p1im2 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/1qj79hnvh79ggpmoddpe0p1im2 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Institutions as cognitive media between strategic interactions and individual beliefs," Chapters, in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 17, pages 298-312, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Robert P. Gilles & Emiliya A. Lazarova & Pieter H. M. Ruys, 2007. "Stability, Specialization And Social Recognition," Division of Labor & Transaction Costs (DLTC), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 2(02), pages 83-109.
    11. Michi Nishihara & Takashi Shibata, 2014. "Preemption, leverage, and financing constraints," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 23(2), pages 75-89, April.
    12. Maseland, Robbert, 2021. "Contingent determinants," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    13. Gennady Bilych, 2013. "Democratic Changes and Economic Growth," Business and Economic Research, Macrothink Institute, vol. 3(1), pages 461-486, June.
    14. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/942 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Torsten Heinrich & Henning Schwardt, 2013. "Institutional Inertia and Institutional Change in an Expanding Normal-Form Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-28, August.
    16. Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2008. "Religion, politics, and development: Lessons from the lands of Islam," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 329-351, November.
    17. Lattanzio, Gabriele, 2022. "Beyond religion and culture: The economic consequences of the institutionalization of sharia law," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    18. Shingo Ishiguro, 2011. "Relationships and Growth," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 11-31-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, revised May 2013.
    19. Alvarez-Diaz, Marcos & Caballero Miguez, Gonzalo, 2008. "The quality of institutions: A genetic programming approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 161-169, January.
    20. ROUGIER Eric, 2015. ""The parts and the whole”: Unbundling and re-bundling institutional systems and their effect on economic development," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2015-12, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
    21. Alice Nicole Sindzingre, 2007. "Poverty traps: a perspective from development economics," Working Papers hal-04139210, HAL.
    22. Guillaume Daudin, 2006. "Paying Transaction Costs," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2006-14, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    23. Robbert Maseland, 2013. "Parasitical cultures? The cultural origins of institutions and development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 109-136, June.
    24. Stewart, James I., 2009. "Cooperation when N is large: Evidence from the mining camps of the American West," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 213-225, March.
    25. Mike Anson & David Bholat & Miao Kang & Ryland Thomas, 2017. "The Bank of England as Lender of Last Resort: New historical evidence from daily transactional data," Working Papers 0117, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    power of attorney; proxy form; trust; agency relations; procuration; mandat; confiance;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01358365. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.