IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01352691.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber market

Author

Listed:
  • Ahmed Barkaoui

    (LEF - Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech)

  • Arnaud Z. Dragicevic

    (LEF - Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech)

Abstract

By considering the French forest-based sector, we study both negotiation and renegotiation between a public timber and roundwood log supplier, which can be either public-interest-oriented or profit-maximizing, and a profit-maximizing lumber manufacturer. We first prove that the Nash bargaining game yields a unique equilibrium log supply contract, at which the negotiation takes only place on the prices. We then find that the expected profit-maximizing is achieved when the supplier's public interest and the manufacturer's bargaining power are strategic substitutes. The renegotiation reveals the presence of a memory effect over the quantities issued from bargaining. Our results can be generalized to all economic settings that revolve around public interest and commodity risk management.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahmed Barkaoui & Arnaud Z. Dragicevic, 2016. "Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber market," Post-Print hal-01352691, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01352691
    DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.04.007
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dragicevic, Arnaud Z. & Barkaoui, Ahmed, 2017. "Forest-based industrial network: Case of the French timber market," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 23-33.
    2. Arnaud Zlatko Dragicevic, 2022. "Exchange Networks with Stochastic Matching," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01352691. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.