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The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules with Mutually Coherent Voter Preferences: A Borda Compromise

Author

Listed:
  • William V. Gehrlein

    (University of Delaware [Newark])

  • Dominique Lepelley

    (CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion)

  • Hatem Smaoui

    (CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion)

Abstract

The Condorcet Efficiency of a voting rule is defined as the conditional probability that the voting rule elects the Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (PMRW), given that a PMRW exists. Five simple voting rules are considered in this paper: Plurality Rule, Negative Plurality Rule, Borda Rule, Plurality Elimination Rule and Negative Plurality Elimination Rule. In order to study the impact that the presence of degrees of group mutual coherence in voting situations will have on the probability of selecting the PMRW for each of these rules, we develop representations for their Condorcet Efficiency as a function of the proximity of voters' preferences on candidates to being perfectly single-peaked, perfectly single-troughed or perfectly polarized. The results we obtain lead us to appeal for a Borda Compromise.

Suggested Citation

  • William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui, 2011. "The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules with Mutually Coherent Voter Preferences: A Borda Compromise," Post-Print hal-01245308, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01245308
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincent Merlin & Marc Fleurbaey & Dominique Lepelley, 2012. "Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 253-257, July.
    2. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Florenz Plassmann, 2016. "Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(5), pages 941-966, September.
    3. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley & Florenz Plassmann, 2018. "An Evaluation of the Benefit of Using Two-Stage Election Procedures," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 53-79, June.

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