IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01129958.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Rainwater harvesting and groundwater conservation: when endogenous heterogeneity matters

Author

Listed:
  • Raphael Soubeyran

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

  • Mabel Tidball

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

  • Agnes Tomini

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Katrin Erdlenbruch

    (UMR G-EAU - Gestion de l'Eau, Acteurs, Usages - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - AgroParisTech - IRSTEA - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

Abstract

In this paper, we focus on resource conservation in a model of decentralized management of groundwater and rainwater. We show that a conservation policy may have opposite effects on the level of the resource, depending on the outcome of the decentralized management. More precisely, we consider identical farmers who can use two water resources (groundwater and/or rainwater) and we study the symmetric and asymmetric feedback stationary Nash equilibria of the dynamic game. We show that a subsidy on the use of rainwater may increase the level of the aquifer at the symmetric equilibrium, whereas it decreases the level of the aquifer at the asymmetric equilibrium. This suggests that the usual focus on (interior) symmetric equilibria in dynamic games may provide misleading policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Raphael Soubeyran & Mabel Tidball & Agnes Tomini & Katrin Erdlenbruch, 2015. "Rainwater harvesting and groundwater conservation: when endogenous heterogeneity matters," Post-Print hal-01129958, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01129958
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-014-9813-9
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01129958
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-01129958/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10640-014-9813-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hubert Stahn & Agnès Tomini, 2015. "Rainwater Harvesting under Endogenous Capacity of Storage : a Solution to Aquifer Preservation," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 119-120, pages 209-234.
    2. Moreaux, Michel & Reynaud, Arnaud, 2006. "Urban freshwater needs and spatial cost externalities for coastal aquifers: A theoretical approach," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 163-186, March.
    3. Ostrom,Elinor, 2015. "Governing the Commons," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107569782, September.
    4. Masahiko Gemma & Yacov Tsur, 2007. "The Stabilization Value of Groundwater and Conjunctive Water Management under Uncertainty," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 540-548.
    5. Tsur, Yacov & Graham-Tomasi, Theodore, 1991. "The buffer value of groundwater with stochastic surface water supplies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 201-224, November.
    6. Sittidaj Pongkijvorasin & James Roumasset, 2007. "Optimal Conjunctive Use of Surface and Groundwater with Recharge and Return Flows: Dynamic and Spatial Patterns ," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 531-539.
    7. Santiago Rubio & Begoña Casino, 2003. "Strategic Behavior and Efficiency in the Common Property Extraction of Groundwater," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(1), pages 73-87, September.
    8. Catarina Roseta-Palma, 2003. "Joint Quantity/Quality Management of Groundwater," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(1), pages 89-106, September.
    9. Naomi Zeitouni & Ariel Dinar, 1997. "Mitigating negative water quality and quality externalities by joint mangement of adjacent aquifers," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(1), pages 1-20, January.
    10. Phoebe Koundouri, 2004. "Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource Management," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(5), pages 703-740, December.
    11. Rubio, Santiago J. & Casino, Begona, 2001. "Competitive versus efficient extraction of a common property resource: The groundwater case," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(8), pages 1117-1137, August.
    12. Darrell Krulce & James A. Roumasset & Tom Wilson, 1997. "Optimal Management of a Renewable and Replaceable Resource: The Case of Coastal Groundwater," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(4), pages 1218-1228.
    13. Roumasset, James A. & Wada, Christopher A., 2012. "Ordering the extraction of renewable resources: The case of multiple aquifers," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 112-128.
    14. Chakravorty, Ujjayant & Umetsu, Chieko, 2003. "Basinwide water management: a spatial model," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-23, January.
    15. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, September.
    16. Knapp Keith C. & Olson Lars J., 1995. "The Economics of Conjunctive Groundwater Management with Stochastic Surface Supplies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 340-356, May.
    17. Hubert Stahn & Agnès Tomini, 2010. "A drop of rainwater against a drop of groundwater: does rainwater harvesting really allow us to spare Groundwater?," Working Papers halshs-00443667, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Stahn, Hubert & Tomini, Agnès, 2017. "On conjunctive management of groundwater and rainwater," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 186-200.
    2. Galik, Christopher S. & McAdams, David, 2017. "Supply, Demand, and Uncertainty: Implications for Prelisting Conservation Policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 91-98.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Katrin Erdlenbruch & Raphael Soubeyran & Mabel Tidball & Agnes Tomini, 2012. "(Anti-)Coordination Problems with Scarce Water Resources," Working Papers 12-28, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Sep 2012.
    2. James Roumasset & Christopher Wada, 2012. "The Economics of Groundwater," Working Papers 201211, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    3. Hubert Stahn & Agnès Tomini, 2014. "On the Environmental Efficiency of Water Storage: The Case of a Conjunctive Use of Ground and Rainwater," AMSE Working Papers 1452, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    4. Amine Chekireb & Julio Goncalves & Hubert Stahn & Agnes Tomini, 2021. "Private exploitation of the North-Western Sahara Aquifer System," Working Papers halshs-03457972, HAL.
    5. Stahn, Hubert & Tomini, Agnès, 2017. "On conjunctive management of groundwater and rainwater," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 186-200.
    6. Stahn, Hubert & Tomini, Agnes, 2021. "Externality and common-pool resources: The case of artesian aquifers," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    7. repec:hae:wpaper:2012-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Hubert Stahn & Agnès Tomini, 2015. "Rainwater Harvesting under Endogenous Capacity of Storage : a Solution to Aquifer Preservation," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 119-120, pages 209-234.
    9. Kiran Krishnamurthy, Chandra, 2012. "Optimal Management of Groundwater under Uncertainty: A Unified Approach," CERE Working Papers 2012:19, CERE - the Center for Environmental and Resource Economics, revised 30 Jun 2014.
    10. Alain Ayong Le Kama & Agnès Tomini, 2012. "Water Conservation versus Soil Salinity Control," Working Papers hal-04141151, HAL.
    11. Stergios Athanassoglou & Glenn Sheriff & Tobias Siegfried & Woonghee Huh, 2012. "Optimal Mechanisms for Heterogeneous Multi-Cell Aquifers," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 52(2), pages 265-291, June.
    12. Phoebe Koundouri, 2004. "Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource Management," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(5), pages 703-740, December.
    13. Msangi, Siwa, 2005. "Measuring the Gains to Groundwater Management with Recursive Utility," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19212, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    14. Eirik S. Amundsen & Frank Jensen, 2016. "Drought and Groundwater Management," IFRO Working Paper 2016/04, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    15. Eirik S. Amundsen & Frank Jensen, 2016. "Drought and Groundwater Management," CESifo Working Paper Series 5968, CESifo.
    16. Reinelt, Peter, 2020. "Spatial-dynamic seawater intrusion and pumping cost externalities in a confined aquifer," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    17. James Roumasset & Christopher Wada, 2013. "Ordering Extraction from Multiple Aquifers," Working Papers 2013-12, University of Hawaii Economic Research Organization, University of Hawaii at Manoa.
    18. Chandra Kiran B. Krishnamurthy, 2017. "Optimal Management of Groundwater Under Uncertainty: A Unified Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(2), pages 351-377, June.
    19. Stergios Athanassoglou & Glenn Sheriff & Tobias Siegfried & Woonghee Tim Huh, 2009. "Simple Mechanisms for Managing Complex Aquifers," NCEE Working Paper Series 200905, National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, revised Oct 2009.
    20. Marta Biancardi & Gianluca Iannucci & Giovanni Villani, 2022. "Groundwater Exploitation and Illegal Behaviors in a Differential Game," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 996-1009, September.
    21. Amundsen, Eirik Schrøder & Jensen, Frank, 2016. "Drought and groundwater management," Working Papers in Economics 05/16, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    groundwater; differential game; asymmetric equilibrium; rainwater;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01129958. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.