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Optimal auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders

Author

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  • Nicolas Gruyer

    (LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile)

Abstract

I consider optimal auctions for a seller who is bound to sell a single item to one of two potential buyers, organized as " well-coordinated " cartel. I show that, even though the seller cannot deter collusion, he can optimally accommodate it by employing a simple mechanism which imposes an inefficient allocation on the bidders unless they pay a sufficiently high amount to avoid it.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Gruyer, 2009. "Optimal auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders," Post-Print hal-01021568, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01021568
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00397.x
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://enac.hal.science/hal-01021568
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    Cited by:

    1. Jeroen Hinloopen & Sander Onderstal, 2010. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-120/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 28 Mar 2013.
    2. Pavlov Gregory, 2011. "A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-18, February.
    3. Pavlov Gregory, 2011. "Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-35, February.
    4. Olga Gorelkina, 2018. "Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions," Working Papers 20182, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.

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