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Does Productivity Decline after Promotion? The Case of French Academia

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  • Mareva Sabatier

    (IREGE - Institut de Recherche en Gestion et en Economie - USMB [Université de Savoie] [Université de Chambéry] - Université Savoie Mont Blanc)

Abstract

The present research examined the effect of promotion decisions on ex-post productivity in French academia. As, once promotion decisions are known, most external incentives vanish for promoted candidates, their productivity was expected to decrease. This hypothesis was tested by using an original dataset and matching methods to evaluate the impact of promotion on publication scores. The robustness of the matching estimates was tested using sensitivity analysis. The results clearly show that the removal of extrinsic incentives following promotion does not lead to a fall in productivity in French academia.

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  • Mareva Sabatier, 2012. "Does Productivity Decline after Promotion? The Case of French Academia," Post-Print hal-00825985, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00825985
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00825985
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    Cited by:

    1. Majda Benzidia & Michel Lubrano, 2016. "A Bayesian Look at American Academic Wages: The Case of Michigan State University," AMSE Working Papers 1628, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    2. Olof Ejermo & Claudio Fassio & John Källström, 2020. "Does Mobility across Universities Raise Scientific Productivity?," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 82(3), pages 603-624, June.

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    Keywords

    promotions; extrinsic and intrinsic incentives; academic career;
    All these keywords.

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