IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-00643547.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Risk-sensitive mean field stochastic differential games

Author

Listed:
  • Hamidou Tembine

    (E3S - Supélec Sciences des Systèmes - Ecole Supérieure d'Electricité - SUPELEC (FRANCE))

  • Quanyan Zhu

    (CSL - Coordinated Science Laboratory - University of Illinois System)

  • Tamer Basar

    (CSL - Coordinated Science Laboratory - University of Illinois System)

Abstract

In this paper, we study a class of risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic di fferential games. Under regularity assumptions, we use results from standard risk-sensitive di fferential game theory to show that the mean- field value of the exponentiated cost functional coincides with the value function of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Fleming (HJBF) equation with an additional quadratic term. We provide an explicit solution of the mean- field best response when the instantaneous cost functions are log-quadratic and the state dynamics are affine in the control. An equivalent mean- field risk-neutral problem is formulated and the corresponding mean-fi eld equilibria are characterized in terms of backward-forward macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equations, Fokker- Planck-Kolmogorov equations and HJBF equations.

Suggested Citation

  • Hamidou Tembine & Quanyan Zhu & Tamer Basar, 2011. "Risk-sensitive mean field stochastic differential games," Post-Print hal-00643547, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00643547
    DOI: 10.3182/20110828-6-IT-1002.02247
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. A. Bensoussan & K. Sung & S. Yam, 2013. "Linear–Quadratic Time-Inconsistent Mean Field Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 537-552, December.
    2. Said Hamadène & Rui Mu, 2021. "Risk-Sensitive Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Game with Unbounded Coefficients," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 84-108, March.
    3. Dario Bauso & Quanyan Zhu & Tamer Başar, 2016. "Decomposition and Mean-Field Approach to Mixed Integer Optimal Compensation Problems," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 169(2), pages 606-630, May.
    4. Minyi Huang, 2013. "A Mean Field Capital Accumulation Game with HARA Utility," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 446-472, December.
    5. Boualem Djehiche & Minyi Huang, 2016. "A Characterization of Sub-game Perfect Equilibria for SDEs of Mean-Field Type," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 55-81, March.
    6. Dario Bauso & Hamidou Tembine & Tamer Başar, 2016. "Robust Mean Field Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 277-303, September.
    7. Fabio Bagagiolo & Dario Bauso, 2014. "Mean-Field Games and Dynamic Demand Management in Power Grids," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 155-176, June.
    8. Jun Moon & Tamer Başar, 2019. "Risk-Sensitive Mean Field Games via the Stochastic Maximum Principle," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 1100-1125, December.
    9. A. Bensoussan & K. C. J. Sung & S. C. P. Yam & S. P. Yung, 2016. "Linear-Quadratic Mean Field Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 169(2), pages 496-529, May.
    10. Dario Bauso & Raffaele Pesenti & Marco Tolotti, 2016. "Opinion Dynamics and Stubbornness Via Multi-Population Mean-Field Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 266-293, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00643547. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.