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Banks' risk race: A signaling explanation

Author

Listed:
  • Radu Vranceanu

    (ESSEC Business School)

  • Damien Besancenot

    (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord (ancienne affiliation) - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Many observers argue that the abnormal accumulation of risk by banks has been one of the major causes of the 2007-2009 financial turmoil. But what could have pushed banks to engage in such a risk race? The answer brought by this paper builds on the classical signaling model by Spence. If banks' returns can be observed while risk cannot, less efficient banks can hide their type by taking more risks and paying the same returns as the efficient banks. The latter can signal themselves by taking even higher risks and delivering bigger returns. The game presents several equilibria that are all characterized by excessive risk taking as compared to the perfect information case.

Suggested Citation

  • Radu Vranceanu & Damien Besancenot, 2010. "Banks' risk race: A signaling explanation," Post-Print hal-00554719, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00554719
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://essec.hal.science/hal-00554719
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Powell, Andrew & Miller, Marcus & Maier, Antonia, 2011. "Prudent Banks and Creative Mimics: Can We Tell the Difference?," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3958, Inter-American Development Bank.
    2. Radu Vranceanu & Damien Besancenot & Kim Huynh, 2009. "Desk rejection in an academic publication market model with matching frictions," Post-Print hal-00554732, HAL.
    3. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2014. "Experimental evidence on the ‘insidious’ illiquidity risk," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 315-323.
    4. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2011. "Experimental Evidence on the 'Insidious' Illiquidity Risk," Post-Print hal-00607867, HAL.
    5. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2011. "Experimental evidence on the "insidious" illiquidity risk," CEPN Working Papers halshs-00602107, HAL.
    6. Gombola, Michael J. & Ho, Amy Yueh-Fang & Huang, Chin-Chuan, 2016. "The effect of leverage and liquidity on earnings and capital management: Evidence from U.S. commercial banks," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 35-58.
    7. Lu, Yunlin & Guo, Haifeng & Kao, Erin H. & Fung, Hung-Gay, 2015. "Shadow banking and firm financing in China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 40-53.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking Sector; Imperfect Information; Risk Strategy; Risk/return Tradeoff; Signaling; Arbitrage risque/rendement; Information imparfaite; Secteur bancaire; Signalisation; Stratégie de risque;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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