IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-00494199.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Nash Networks with Imperfect Reliability and Heterogeneous Players

Author

Listed:
  • Pascal Billand

    (CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne)

  • Christophe Bravard
  • Sudipta Sarangi

    (ECE - Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering - Louisiana State University - LSU - Louisiana State University)

Abstract

This paper combines the imperfect reliability model of Bala and Goyal [2000b] with the heterogeneous player model of Galeottiet al.[2006]. We compare existence, characterization and efficiency results in the resulting framework with the results in other frameworks allowing for imperfect reliability or heterogeneity. Specifically, we compare our work with the framework of Haller and Sarangi [2005] which allows for heterogeneity in link reliability but assumes that players are homogeneous. We find, by contrast with their paper, that non existence of Nash networks is possible in our framework even if the population is very small. Moreover, although the incentives of players to maintain (or delete) links are different, in both frameworks there exist parameters such that every essential network is strict Nash and efficient.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi, 2010. "Nash Networks with Imperfect Reliability and Heterogeneous Players," Post-Print hal-00494199, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00494199
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:use:tkiwps:3434 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. K. de Jaegher & J.J.A. Kamphorst, 2009. "Two-way Flow Networks with Small Decay," Working Papers 09-34, Utrecht School of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Charoensook, Banchongsan, 2016. "Nodewise Decay in Two-way Flow Nash Network: a Study of Network Congestion," ETA: Economic Theory and Applications 249353, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    2. Banchongsan Charoensook, 2016. "Nodewise Decay in Two-way Flow Nash Network: a Study of Network Congestion," Working Papers 2016.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi & J. Kamphorst, 2011. "Confirming information flows in networks," Post-Print halshs-00672351, HAL.
    2. Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi & PHILIPP MÖHLMEIER & AGNIESZKA RUSINOWSKA & EMILY TANIMURA, 2016. "A Degree-Distance-Based Connections Model with Negative and Positive Externalities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(2), pages 168-192, April.
    3. Cui, Zhiwei & Wang, Shouyang & Zhang, Jin & Zu, Lei, 2013. "Stochastic stability in one-way flow networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 410-421.
    4. De Jaegher, K. & Kamphorst, J.J.A., 2015. "Minimal two-way flow networks with small decay," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 217-239.
    5. repec:hal:pseose:hal-01387467 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00494199. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.