IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-00279365.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Meet-or-release and most-favoured-customer clauses with price-quantity competition yield Cournot outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • Claude d'Aspremont

    (CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain)

  • Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

It is shown that, in a well-defined market environment where demand is such that market revenue is decreasing in price, if all firms compete simultaneously in prices and quantities, and offer sales contracts which combine the meet-or-release clause with a most-favored-customer clause, then the industry sub-game perfect equilibrium will coincide with the Cournot solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude d'Aspremont & Rodolphe dos Santos Ferreira, 2006. "Meet-or-release and most-favoured-customer clauses with price-quantity competition yield Cournot outcomes," Post-Print hal-00279365, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279365
    DOI: 10.4000/economiepublique.3040
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00279365. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.