Evaluating Climate Policies by the Pareto Principle: Efficiency When Future Identities Are Unobservable
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Abstract
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Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03760333
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Other versions of this item:
- Geir B. Asheim & Kohei Kamaga & Stéphane Zuber, 2022. "Evaluating Climate Policies by the Pareto Principle: Efficiency When Future Identities Are Unobservable," Working Papers halshs-03760333, HAL.
- Geir B. Asheim & Kohei Kamaga & Stéphane Zuber, 2022. "Evaluating Climate Policies by the Pareto Principle: Efficiency When Future Identities Are Unobservable," CESifo Working Paper Series 9575, CESifo.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Pivato, Marcus, 2022.
"A characterization of Cesàro average utility,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
- Marcus Pivato, 2022. "A characterization of Cesàro average utility," Post-Print hal-03637879, HAL.
- Asheim, Geir B. & Kamaga, Kohei & Zuber, Stéphane, 2022.
"Maximal sensitivity under Strong Anonymity,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
- Geir Asheim & Kohei Kamaga & Stéphane Zuber, 2022. "Maximal sensitivity under Strong Anonymity," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03856615, HAL.
- Geir Asheim & Kohei Kamaga & Stéphane Zuber, 2022. "Maximal sensitivity under Strong Anonymity," Post-Print halshs-03856615, HAL.
- Geir Asheim & Kohei Kamaga & Stéphane Zuber, 2022. "Maximal sensitivity under Strong Anonymity," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03856615, HAL.
More about this item
Keywords
climate change; efficiency; intergenerational equity; population ethics; infinite streams;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENE-2022-10-03 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2022-10-03 (Environmental Economics)
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