IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/cesptp/halshs-03023015.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Reasoning in attitudes

Author

Listed:
  • Franz Dietrich

    (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Antonios Staras

    (Cardiff University)

Abstract

People reason not just in beliefs, but also in intentions, preferences, and other attitudes. They form preferences from existing preferences, or intentions from existing beliefs and intentions, and so on, often facing choices between rival between rival conclusions. Building on Broome (2013) and Dietrich et al. (2019), we present a philosophical and formal analysis of reasoning in attitudes with or without facing such choices. Reasoning in attitudes is a mental activity that differs fundamentally from reasoning about attitudes, a form of theoretical reasoning by which one discovers rather than forms attitudes. Reasoning in attitudes has standard format features (such as monotonicity), but is indeterministic (reflecting choice in reasoning). Like theoretical reasoning, it need not follow logical entailment, but for different reasons related to indeterminism. This makes reasoning in attitudes harder to model logically than theoretical reasoning.

Suggested Citation

  • Franz Dietrich & Antonios Staras, 2022. "Reasoning in attitudes," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03023015, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-03023015
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03023015v3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03023015v3/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Keywords

    reasoning; logic; mental states; John Broome; rationality;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-03023015. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.