IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/cesptp/hal-04235362.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Results of Monetary Priceless on Political Coordination
[Les effets de l’absence de prix monétaire sur la coordination politique]

Author

Listed:
  • François Facchini

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper studies the implications of the lack of monetary prices for the modes of individuals calculus' coordination on the "political market". On the economic market, the evaluation of decision costs is based on monetary prices. The entrepreneurs' decisions are led by the profit expectations they build on the information embodied in market prices. Given that there is no price on the "political market", how are individuals informed? What are their incentives to act? And how are their actions coordinated? It is argued that 1) the electoral system provides information on the individuals' preferences between "being candidate" and "being represented", 2) the individuals are induced to be candidate since the existing political supply does not meet their expectations, and 3) the coordination is achieved through ideology that acts as a signaling mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • François Facchini, 2000. "Results of Monetary Priceless on Political Coordination [Les effets de l’absence de prix monétaire sur la coordination politique]," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-04235362, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-04235362
    DOI: 10.2202/1145-6396.1151
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04235362
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-04235362/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1145-6396.1151?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-04235362. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.