Cotisations sociales, taxes et déficit : évolution du financement de la protection sociale en Europe 1980-2007

We propose a systematic analysis of the evolution of social security receipts in 16 European countries, using OECD and Eurostat dataset. We find that in 12 out of 16 countries the change in the share of social security receipts over GDP is mainly related to the change in budgetary expenditures (and weakly related to the change in social contributions). More precisely, even in Bismarckian countries where social contributions represent the largest share of social protection receipt, expansion or retrenchment in social expenditure are associated with variations in budgetary expenditure. In latter countries, politics of social protection have thus moved from the bargaining between labor markets actors, toward a fiscal issue dealt in the parliament. We also investigate whether the variations in social protection expenditures are funded through tax revenue, deficit, or change in other budgetary expenditures. Eventually we try to determine the groups of tax-payer who have gained/lost in increase/decrease in social protection. We conclude by making the case for an interest-based approach of the political economy of social protection reform: the analysis of the funding structure of social protection gives clues on the potential winners/losers of cuts/ expansion of social protection, and thus on the group likely to have been the political basis of reform.