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Why does Bad News Increase Volatility and Decrease Leverage?

Author

Listed:
  • Ana Fostel

    (Institute for International Economic Policy, George Washington University)

  • John Geanakoplos

    (Department of Economics, Yale University)

Abstract

The literature on leverage until now shows how an increase in volatility reduces leverage. However, in order to explain pro-cyclical leverage it assumes that bad news increases volatility. This paper suggests a reason why bad news is more often than not associated with higher future volatility. We show that, in a model with endogenous leverage and heterogeneous beliefs, agents have the incentive to invest mostly in technologies that become volatile in bad times. Together with the old literature this explains pro-cyclical leverage. The result also gives rationale to the pattern of volatility smiles observed in the stock options since 1987. Finally, the paper presents for the first time a dynamic model in which an asset is endogenously traded simultaneously at different margin requirements in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, 2010. "Why does Bad News Increase Volatility and Decrease Leverage?," Working Papers 2010-18, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
  • Handle: RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2010-18
    as

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    File URL: http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/Fostel_IIEPWP2010-18.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 1997. "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 211-248, April.
    2. Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, 2008. "Collateral restrictions and liquidity under-supply: a simple model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(3), pages 441-467, June.
    3. Caballero, Ricardo J. & Krishnamurthy, Arvind, 2001. "International and domestic collateral constraints in a model of emerging market crises," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 513-548, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, 2012. "Tranching, CDS, and Asset Prices: How Financial Innovation Can Cause Bubbles and Crashes," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 190-225, January.
    2. Matt Darst & Ehraz Refayet, 2017. "A Model of Endogenous Debt Maturity with Heterogeneous Beliefs," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-057, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Augusto Hasman, 2013. "A Critical Review Of Contagion Risk In Banking," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(5), pages 978-995, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Endogenous Leverage; Post-Bad News Volatility; Post-Good News Volatility; Volatility Smile;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates

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