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Equitable Voting with Many Alternatives

Author

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  • Steven Kivinen

    (University of Graz, Austria)

Abstract

Voting procedures in many democracies satisfy a weak version of fairness called equity (Bartholdi et al., 2021) while violating the standard fairness criterion of anonymity. We study equitable voting procedures when there are more than two alternatives that can be ordered on a left-right political spectrum. While the median of the median voter rule is not a generalized median voter (GMV) rule, we show that it is non-manipulable and equitable. There exist non-manipulable, equitable voting rules with winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population. In addition, with the help of some recent group theoretic results, we give conditions under which equity can be used to characterize the class of GMV rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven Kivinen, 2025. "Equitable Voting with Many Alternatives," Graz Economics Papers 2025-03, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:grz:wpaper:2025-03
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting; Equity; Strategy-proofness; Median of the Medians;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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