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The Causal Effect of Market Participation on Trust: An Experimental Investigation Using Randomized Control

Author

Listed:
  • Omar Al-Ubaydli

    (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)

  • Daniel Houser

    (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)

  • John V.C. Nye

    (Department of Economics, George Mason University)

  • Maria Pia Paganelli

    (Department of Economics, Trinity University)

  • Xiaofei (Sophia) Pan

    (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)

Abstract

In randomized control laboratory experiments, we find that those primed to think about markets exhibit more trusting behavior. We randomly and unconsciously prime experimental participants to think about markets and trade. We then ask them to play a trust game involving an anonymous stranger. We compare the behavior of these individuals with that of a group who are not primed to think about anything in particular. Priming for market participation affects positively the beliefs about the trustworthiness of anonymous strangers, increasing trust.

Suggested Citation

  • Omar Al-Ubaydli & Daniel Houser & John V.C. Nye & Maria Pia Paganelli & Xiaofei (Sophia) Pan, 2011. "The Causal Effect of Market Participation on Trust: An Experimental Investigation Using Randomized Control," Working Papers 1027, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:gms:wpaper:1027
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Schniter, Eric & Sheremeta, Roman, 2014. "Predictable and Predictive Emotions: Explaining Cheap Signals and Trust Re-Extension," MPRA Paper 59665, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Cappelen, Alexander W. & Sørensen, Erik Ø. & Tungodden, Bertil, 2013. "When do we lie?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 258-265.
    3. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2011. "Economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements?," Department of Economics University of Siena 617, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    4. Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2012. "Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(2), pages 368-425, June.
    5. Thomas Buser & Anna Dreber, 2016. "The Flipside of Comparative Payment Schemes," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(9), pages 2626-2638, September.
    6. Desiree A. Desierto, 2012. "Reforming Institutions and Building Trust To Achieve Sustained Economic Development," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201218, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
    7. Juan José Barrios & Santiago Acerenza, 2018. "Feelings about competition and selfreported trust. Evidence from the World Value Surveys," Documentos de Investigación 117, Universidad ORT Uruguay. Facultad de Administración y Ciencias Sociales.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    trust; markets; institutions; belief; priming;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • P10 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - General

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