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Optimal Tax Rate Of Cigarette Excise Tax In Indonesia

Author

Listed:
  • Muhammad Fawdy Renardi Wahyu

    (Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada)

  • Ardyanto Fitrady

    (Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada)

Abstract

We analyze the optimal cigarette excise tax rate based on the optimal tax theory. We find that the optimal tax is different when there is an illegal production of cigarettes. We find that, without illegal production of cigarettes, the government can achieve the first best optimum condition by fully internalizing externality. The government can optimally choose the amount of tax on legal cigarettes that is equal to the marginal cost of health care. When there is an illegal production of cigarettes, we find that the rate of cigarette excise tax is not equal to the marginal cost of health care. Therefore, the government need more policy instruments to achieve the optimal tax rate in this case. We also find that an increase in the work hours of a legal cigarette production reduces illegal cigarette productions. Policymakers can use marginal income tax policy as an incentive to reduce illegal production of cigarettes.

Suggested Citation

  • Muhammad Fawdy Renardi Wahyu & Ardyanto Fitrady, 2023. "Optimal Tax Rate Of Cigarette Excise Tax In Indonesia," Gadjah Mada Economics Working Paper Series 202303001, Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada.
  • Handle: RePEc:gme:wpaper:202303001
    as

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    File URL: https://econworkingpaper.feb.ugm.ac.id/download/working_paper/202303001.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal Tax; Excise Tax; Indonesia Cigarettes Excise Tax;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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