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Cooperation and equity in the river sharing problem

Author

Listed:
  • Ambec, S.
  • Ehlers, L.

Abstract

This paper considers environments in which several agents (countries, farmers, cities) share water from a river. Each agent enjoys a concave benefit function from consuming water up to a satiation level. Noncooperative extraction is typically inefficient and any group of agents can gain if they agree on how to allocate water with monetary compensations. The paper describes which allocations of water and money are acceptable to riparian agents according to core stability and several criteria of fairness. It reviews some theoretical results. It then discusses the implementation of the proposed allocation with negotiation rules and in water markets. Lastly, it provides some policy insights.

Suggested Citation

  • Ambec, S. & Ehlers, L., 2007. "Cooperation and equity in the river sharing problem," Working Papers 200705, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
    • Handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200705
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    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://gael.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/sites/default/files/Mediatheque/doc-recherche/WP/A2007/gael2007-06.pdf
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    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Erik Ansink & Carmen Marchiori, 2015. "Reallocating Water: An Application of Sequential Sharing Rules to Cyprus," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 1(04), pages 1-22, December.
    2. Hurt, Wesley & Osório, António (António Miguel), 2014. "A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources," Working Papers 2072/237596, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    3. Baomin Dong & Debing Ni & Yuntong Wang, 2012. "Sharing a Polluted River Network," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(3), pages 367-387, November.
    4. Wang, Yuntong, 2011. "Trading water along a river," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 124-130, March.
    5. Alexandre Le Vernoy & Patrick Messerlin, 2010. "Water and the WTO: Don’t kill the messenger," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5l6uh8ogmqi, Sciences Po.
    6. Ansink, Erik & Houba, Harold, 2016. "Sustainable agreements on stochastic river flow," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 92-117.
    7. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, December.
    8. Rodney Beard, 2011. "The river sharing problem : A review of the technical literature for policy economists," Post-Print hal-00827354, HAL.
    9. Dagmawi Mulugeta Degefu & Weijun He & Liang Yuan & Jian Hua Zhao, 2016. "Water Allocation in Transboundary River Basins under Water Scarcity: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 30(12), pages 4451-4466, September.
    10. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/5l6uh8ogmqildh09h2qa1ccc1 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/5l6uh8ogmqildh09h2qa1ccc1 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Alexandre Le Vernoy & Patrick Messerlin, 2010. "Water and the WTO: Don’t kill the messenger," Post-Print hal-03461720, HAL.
    13. Hu Lu & Yuntong Wang, 2014. "Efficient trading on a network with incomplete information," Working Papers 1405, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    14. Osorio, Antonio, 2014. "A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources," MPRA Paper 56690, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5l6uh8ogmqildh09h2qa1ccc1 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    WATER ALLOCATION; GAME; CORE; WATER MARKET; NEGOTIATION; RULES; EXTERNALITIES;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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