The political cost of integration: A natural experiment on local governments

The existing literature identifies a negative relationship between jurisdiction size and voter participation. Previous studies have primarily examined this correlation through local government mergers or amalgamations, which often fail to establish a robust causal link due to limitations in natural experimental settings. To address this gap, we analyze the French experience of intermunicipal cooperation (2001–2018), where municipalities transfer specific responsibilities and fiscal revenues from the local to the intermunicipal level. Leveraging an exogenous population-based rule, our analysis reveals that voter turnout in municipal elections significantly declines in newly integrated communities. This reduction in participation is enduring, persisting even after the introduction of direct elections for intermunicipal governments. Further analysis on the mechanisms behind these effects shows that these municipalities experience a notable decrease in fiscal revenues for approximately two years following their integration decision. Our findings suggest that when less is at stake, in terms of responsibilities and fiscal revenues in highly integrated municipalities, citizens feel less involved and electoral participation decreases.