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Signaling the value of a business concept : Evidence from a structural model with Brazilian franchising data

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  • Muriel Fadairo

    (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France)

  • Cintya Lanchimba Lopez

    (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France)

Abstract

Within the wide literature regarding franchising, a few studies were devoted to the adverse selection phenomena in the franchise relationships, and to the signaling explanation of the franchisors’ organizational choices. Previous empirical works concluded that the signaling framework is not well adapted to study franchising. However, most of the empirical literature has focused on developed countries. This empirical paper deals with the case of Brazil. We estimate on recent franchising data a structural equation model capturing the simultaneous influences of a valuable business concept. The paper provides evidence that the signaling theory is adequate to understand the organizational choices regarding the ownership structure of franchised networks in emerging markets. The estimation results suggest indeed that the Brazilian franchisors use signaling devices, and that the necessity to signal the value of a business concept affects the organizational choices at the network level.

Suggested Citation

  • Muriel Fadairo & Cintya Lanchimba Lopez, 2012. "Signaling the value of a business concept : Evidence from a structural model with Brazilian franchising data," Working Papers 1228, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1228
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Heiko Karle & Christian Staat, 2013. "Signaling Quality with Initially Reduced Royalty Rates," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2013-44, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Franchising; Emerging countries; Signaling theory; Structural Equation Modeling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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