The Potential Disadvantage Of Becoming Too Large In Duopolistic Industry
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- Chaim Fershtman & Eitan Muller, 1988. "The Potential Disadvantage of Becoming Too Large In Duopolistic Industry," Discussion Papers 794, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
References listed on IDEAS
- Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
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Keywords
oligopolies ; market ; consumers ; industry;All these keywords.
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