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Reason-Based Choice and Justifiability in Extensive Form Games

Author

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  • Spiegler, R.

Abstract

This paper proposes a procedurally rational solution concept for two-person extensive-form games with complete information. The solution concept is based on the observation that the ex-post justifiability of choices is often a primary concern for decision-makers, especially in organizations. The essential departure from standard rationality lies in the assumption that players have to consider not only the optimality of their strategy, but also the reasonableness of the beliefs that support it. Specifically, they face ex-post criticism, which consists of a (deterministic) theory of the opponent's strategy as well as an alternative recommended strategy. The theory must be consistent with the history and there can be no consistent theory that is simpler. The alternative strategy must do better than the player's strategy against the theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Spiegler, R., 1999. "Reason-Based Choice and Justifiability in Extensive Form Games," Papers 19-99, Tel Aviv.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:19-99
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
    2. Spiegler, Ran, 2005. "Testing threats in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 214-235, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    GAME THEORY ; BEHAVIOUR ; UNCERTAINTY;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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