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Coordination in Oligopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Stennek, J.

Abstract

The private and social efficiency of two "behavioral" coordination mechanisms is examined in this paper. In Cournot oligopoly, firms prefer immediate coordination on the Nash equilibrium (interpreted as a preplay communication) over the best-reply dynamics (and fictitious play) which converge to the equilibrium, but with delay (interpreted as a decentralized learning process). In Bertrand oligopoly, firms prefer the learning process.

Suggested Citation

  • Stennek, J., 1997. "Coordination in Oligopoly," Papers 634, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:stocin:634
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    Cited by:

    1. Baccini, Leonardo & Lenzi, Veronica & Thurner, Paul W., 2013. "Global energy governance: trade, infrastructure, and the diffusion of international organizations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 62309, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Florent Venayre, 2004. "Échanges d'informations : les jurisprudences française et communautaire - À l'aune des prédictions théoriques," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 108(1), pages 91-112.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    OLIGOPOLIES ; NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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