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Corporate Financial Structure, Incentives and Optimal Contracting (Reprint 049)

Author

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  • Franklin Allen
  • Andrew Winton

Abstract

The firm can be regarded as consisting of several groups of investors and managers whose interests are regulated by the contracts between them. This survey covers the literature that looks at the nature of optimal financial contracts in the face of various asymmetries of information, control and type. Five areas are considered: (i) costly state verification and agency; (ii) adverse selection; (iii) the allocation of control rights among investors and the design of ownership structure; (iv) the allocation of risk and (v) acquisition of information.

Suggested Citation

  • Franklin Allen & Andrew Winton, "undated". "Corporate Financial Structure, Incentives and Optimal Contracting (Reprint 049)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-94, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:pennfi:15-94
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    Cited by:

    1. Kaplan, Steven & Strömberg, Per, 2002. "Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses," CEPR Discussion Papers 3243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315.
    3. Chowdhry, Bhagwan & Grinblatt, Mark, 1997. "Information Aggregation, Currency Swaps, and the Design of Derivative Securities," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt0js61067, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
    4. Vesa Kanniainen & Rune Stenbacka, 1997. "Project Monitoring and Banking Competition under Adverse Selection," CIG Working Papers FS IV 97-23, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Oct 1998.
    5. Axelson, Ulf, 2005. "Security Design with Investor Private Information," SIFR Research Report Series 37, Institute for Financial Research.
    6. Andrew Winton, 1996. "Monitored finance, liquidity, and institutional investment choice," Working Papers (Old Series) 9616, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    7. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 2000. "Optimal Financial Contracts for Large Investors: The Role of Lender Liability," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 99-33, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    8. Damodaran, Aswath & John, Kose & Liu, Crocker H., 2005. "What motivates managers?: Evidence from organizational form changes," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 1-26, December.
    9. Bhagwan Chowdhry & Mark Grinblatt & David Levine, 2002. "Information Aggregation, Security Design, and Currency Swaps," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 609-633, June.
    10. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 1999. "Financial contracts and the legal treatment of informed investors," Working Papers 99-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    11. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger, 2003. "Credit Risk Analysis and Security Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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