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A Set-Theoretical Comparison of C2 Social Choice Correspondences

Author

Listed:
  • De Donder, P.
  • Le Breton, M.
  • Truchon, M.

Abstract

Given the choice sets produced by a pair of Condorcet social choice correspondence, the following intersting questions arise. Does one of these sets always contain the other? If not, do they always interest or on the contrary can they have an empty intersection? Laffond, Laslier and Le Breton (1995) answer these questions for Condorcet social choice correspondences based exclusively on the simple majority relation, callaed C1 choice correspondences by Fishburn (1977). In the present paper, we conduct the same task for five Condorcet correspondences that require the size of the majorities to operate.

Suggested Citation

  • De Donder, P. & Le Breton, M. & Truchon, M., 1996. "A Set-Theoretical Comparison of C2 Social Choice Correspondences," Papers 180, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:nodapa:180
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    Cited by:

    1. Le Breton, Michel & Truchon, Michel, 1997. "A Borda measure for social choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 249-272, October.
    2. Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 1998. "The political economy of targeting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 177-200, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    SOCIAL CHOICE; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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