Adoption of Standards under Uncertainty
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Other versions of this item:
- Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2005. "Adoption of Standards Under Uncertainty," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 816-832, Winter.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Jack Ochs, 2006. "Dynamic Network Formation," Working Paper 233, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2006.
- Ochs, Jack & Park, In-Uck, 2010.
"Overcoming the coordination problem: Dynamic formation of networks,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 689-720, March.
- Ochs, Jack & Park, In-Uck, 2004. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," CEI Working Paper Series 2004-18, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Jack Ochs & In-Uck Park, 2005. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Gary Biglaiser & Jacques Crémer, 2020. "The Value of Incumbency When Platforms Face Heterogeneous Customers," Post-Print hal-03049041, HAL.
- Min-Hung Tsay, 2012. "Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology: comment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1680-1686.
- Martin A. Lariviere & Jan A. Van Mieghem, 2004. "Strategically Seeking Service: How Competition Can Generate Poisson Arrivals," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 23-40, January.
- Bumin Yenmez, M., 2012. "Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 77-82.
- Frederik Schmidt, 2008. "Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(3), pages 189-208, September.
- , & , P., 2014.
"Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean, 2011. "Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games," Departmental Working Papers 201125, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Sofia Moroni, 2018. "Games with Private Timing," Working Paper 6400, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
- Gary Biglaiser & Jacques Crémer & André Veiga, 2022. "Should I stay or should I go? Migrating away from an incumbent platform," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(3), pages 453-483, September.
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