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The Dynamics of the Strategic Capital Accumulation

Author

Listed:
  • Figuieres, C.
  • Garderes, P.
  • Michel, P.
  • Rychen, F.

Abstract

Dans un jeu differentiel d'accumulation de capital a deux joueurs avec investissement reversible nous proposons une methode simplificatrice pour calculer l'equilibre de Nash en boucle ouverte. nous calculons aussi la solution centralisee et nous comparons les deux resultats a travers leurs proprietes dynamiques, c'est-a-dire leur mode et leur taux de convergence. nous demontrons que les deux resultats ont pour proprietecommune qu'un des deux stocks suivra une trajectoire non monotone. C'est une consequence a moyen terme des differences de conditiond initiales et de l'heterogeneite des agents. En revanche les solutions different par le taux de convergence des variables agregees quiest plus grand pour la solution centralisee.

Suggested Citation

  • Figuieres, C. & Garderes, P. & Michel, P. & Rychen, F., 1995. "The Dynamics of the Strategic Capital Accumulation," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 97a28, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:97a28
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    Cited by:

    1. Figuières, Charles & Gardères, Philippe & Rychen, Frédéric, 2002. "Infrastructures publiques et politiques de développement décentralisées," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 78(4), pages 539-570, Décembre.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    THEORIE DES JEUX ; INFORMATION;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure

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