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Just the Facts Ma'am: A Case Study of the Reversal of Corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department

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  • R. Mark R. Isaac

    (Department of Economics, Florida State University)

  • Douglas A. Norton

    (Department of Economics, Florida State University)

Abstract

We present here a case study of successful institutional change in the 1950s Los Angeles Police Department in which Police Chief William H. Parker produced a stunning record of effective reforms. Parker used a combination of institutional reforms that economists can view as changes in incentives, but he also devoted substantial resources to changes in values. Finally, we apply this history to modern day development economics.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Mark R. Isaac & Douglas A. Norton, 2011. "Just the Facts Ma'am: A Case Study of the Reversal of Corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department," Working Papers wp2011_08_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2011_08_01
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; institutions; equilibrium selection; media; values;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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