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Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information

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  • Michele Gori

Abstract

We introduce and study a new property for social choice functions, called PC-strategy-proofness, which is weaker than strategy-proofness. A social choice function is PC-strategy-proof if it cannot be manipulated by an individual whose information about the preferences of the other members of the society is limited to the knowledge, for every pair of alternatives, of the number of individuals preferring the first alternative to the second one. We prove that, when at least three alternatives are considered, there is no Pareto optimal, anonymous and PC-strategy-proof social choice function.

Suggested Citation

  • Michele Gori, 2019. "Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information," Working Papers - Economics wp2019_12.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    • Handle: RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2019_12.rdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social choice function; manipulability; strategy-proofness; pairwise comparison; anonymity; Pareto optimality.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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