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Endogenous Public Evidence in Committee Persuasion Games and Private Communication

Author

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  • Luca Ferrari

    (Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa)

Abstract

I extend a Jury decision making model allowing jurors to observe, in addition to their private information, public evidence strategically designed by a Prosecutor who wants to maximize the probability of conviction of a defendant under trial. I show that jurors’ communication, modeled as a non-binding straw vote before the final verdict, allows the Jury to force Prosecutor to supply evidence whose accuracy becomes perfect as the num- ber of jurors goes to infinity. Thus, the same outcome predicted by the Condorcet’s Jury Theorem is reached although evidence is strategically de- signed so as to prevent this outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Luca Ferrari, 2017. "Endogenous Public Evidence in Committee Persuasion Games and Private Communication," Working Papers - Economics wp2017_06.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    • Handle: RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2017_06.rdf
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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