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(UBS Pensions Series 043) The Optimal Design of Funded Pensions

Author

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  • Luciano Greco

Abstract

In many countries, pension funds based on individual accounts have been affected by high operating costs. Contract theory helps to unravel the nature of such problems: managers of pension funds have strong incentives to manipulate market expectations about their capacity through wasteful activities (e.g. promotion). Thus, competition among pension funds entails efficiency loses, due to pension savings attraction efforts, as well as gains, related to investments in asset management skills. Regulations capping fees or costs of pension funds worsen market inefficiency, while a public pension fund competing with private ones improves (at least weekly) it. Taking into account political and commitment constraints affecting public institutions, a quasi-competitive pension scheme - centralizing contribution collection, auctioning the right to manage raised money to competitive fund managers, and affording an opting out choice to households -Pareto-dominates (at least weekly) the market of pension funds.Keywords: Pension funds, signaling, Public-private provision mechanismJEL classification: D02, H11, H55

Suggested Citation

  • Luciano Greco, 2006. "(UBS Pensions Series 043) The Optimal Design of Funded Pensions," FMG Discussion Papers dp567, Financial Markets Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp567
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    File URL: http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/workingPapers/discussionPapers/fmgdps/dp567UBS043.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    pension funds; signaling; public-private provision mechanismjel classification: d02; h11; h55;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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