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The Near Impossibility of Credit Rationing

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  • David De Meza
  • David C Webb

Abstract

Equilibrium credit rationing in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) implies the marginal cost of funds to the borrower is infinite. So borrowers have an overwhelming incentive to cut their loan by a dollar and thereby avoiding being rationed. Ways of doing this include scaling down the project, cutting consumption or infinitesimally delaying the project to accumulate more saving. All of these routes are normally feasible in which case credit rationing is impossible.

Suggested Citation

  • David De Meza & David C Webb, 2003. "The Near Impossibility of Credit Rationing," FMG Discussion Papers dp459, Financial Markets Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp459
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1992. "Some Evidence on the Empirical Significance of Credit Rationing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 1047-1077, October.
    2. Simon Parker, 2000. "Saving to Overcome Borrowing Constraints: Implications for Small Business Entry and Exit," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 223-232, November.
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    4. David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
    5. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    6. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
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    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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