Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy
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Other versions of this item:
- Francesca Cornelli & Leonardo Felli, "undated". "Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 18-98, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Cornelli, Francesca & Felli, Leonardo, 1998. "Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2030, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Cited by:
- Renée Birgit Adams & Francesca Cornelli & Leonardo Felli, 2012.
"How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company,"
International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 197-226, June.
- Francesca Cornelli & Leonardo Felli, 2000. "How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company," CESifo Working Paper Series 292, CESifo.
- Felli, Leonardo & Cornelli, Francesca, 2001. "How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2881, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cornelli, Francesca & Felli, Leonardo, 2010. "How to sell a (bankrupt) company?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4685, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN & Erik BERGLÖF & Gérard ROLAND, 2003. "Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 03.13, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 2000.
"Optimal financial contracts for large investors: the role of lender liability,"
Working Papers
00-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 2000. "Optimal Financial Contracts for Large Investors: The Role of Lender Liability," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 99-33, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CFN-2000-05-16 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-FIN-2000-05-16 (Finance)
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