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Incumbency Disadvantage in U.S. National Politics: The Role of Policy Inertia and Prospective Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Satyajit Chatterjee
  • Burcu Eyigungor

Abstract

We document that postwar U.S. national elections show a strong pattern of incumbency disadvantage\": If the presidency has been held by a party for some time, that party tends to lose seats in Congress. We develop a model of partisan politics with policy inertia and prospective voting to explain this finding. Positive and normative implications of the model are explored.

Suggested Citation

  • Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2017. "Incumbency Disadvantage in U.S. National Politics: The Role of Policy Inertia and Prospective Voting," Working Papers 17-43, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:17-43
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    File URL: https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/working-papers/2017/wp17-43.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rational partisan model; incumbency disadvantage; policy inertia; prospective voting; median voter;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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