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The emergence and future of central counterparties

Author

Listed:
  • Thorsten Koeppl
  • Cyril Monnet

Abstract

The authors explain why central counterparties (CCPs) emerged historically. With standardized contracts, it is optimal to insure counterparty risk by clearing those contracts through a CCP that uses novation and mutualization. As netting is not essential for these services, it does not explain why CCPs exist. In over-the-counter markets, as contracts are customized and not fungible, a CCP cannot fully guarantee contract performance. Still, a CCP can help: As bargaining leads to an inefficient allocation of default risk relative to the gains from customization, a transfer scheme is needed. A CCP can implement it by offering partial insurance for customized contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet, 2010. "The emergence and future of central counterparties," Working Papers 10-30, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:10-30
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David Mills & Francesca Carapella, 2012. "Information insensitive securities: the benefits of central counterparties," 2012 Meeting Papers 1032, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Wenqian Huang & Elöd Takáts, 2024. "Model Risk at Central Counterparties: Is Skin in the Game a Game Changer?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 20(3), pages 161-184, July.
    3. Massimiliano Affinito & Matteo Piazza, 2021. "Always Look on the Bright Side? Central Counterparties and Interbank Markets during the Financial Crisis," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 17(1), pages 231-283, March.
    4. Antinolfi, Gaetano & Carapella, Francesca & Carli, Francesco, 2022. "Transparency and collateral: central versus bilateral clearing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(1), January.
    5. Cyril Monnet & Thomas Nellen, 2021. "The Collateral Costs of Clearing," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(5), pages 939-970, August.
    6. Vuillemey, G. & Breton, R., 2014. "Endogenous Derivative Networks," Working papers 483, Banque de France.
    7. Borghan Nezami Narajabad & Cyril Monnet, 2012. "Why Rent When You Can Buy? A Theory of Repurchase Agreements," 2012 Meeting Papers 647, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Bruno Biais & Florian Heider & Marie Hoerova, 2012. "Clearing, Counterparty Risk, and Aggregate Risk," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 60(2), pages 193-222, July.
    9. Gaetano Antinolfi & Francesca Carapella & Francesco Carli, 2019. "Transparency and Collateral: The Design of CCPs' Loss Allocation Rules," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-058, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    10. Hattori, Takahiro, 2023. "The premium and settlement of CCPs during the financial crisis: Evidence from the JGB market," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    11. Binbin Deng, 2017. "Counterparty risk, central counterparty clearing and aggregate risk," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 355-400, November.
    12. Francesco Carli & Francesca Carapella & Gaetano Antinolfi, 2014. "Clearing, transparency, and collateral," 2014 Meeting Papers 1090, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    13. Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2011. "Time for Stability in Derivatives Markets – a New Look at Central Counterparty Clearing for Securities Markets," C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute, issue 329, May.
    14. Gibson, Rajna & Murawski, Carsten, 2013. "Margining in derivatives markets and the stability of the banking sector," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 1119-1132.
    15. Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2013. "The Limits Of Central Counterparty Clearing: Collusive Moral Hazard And Market Liquidity," Working Paper 1312, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    16. Barroso, Ricardo Vieira & Lima, Joaquim Ignacio Alves Vasconcellos & Lucchetti, Alexandre Henrique & Cajueiro, Daniel Oliveira, 2016. "Interbank network and regulation policies: an analysis through agent-based simulations with adaptive learning," MPRA Paper 73308, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Risk management; Over-the-counter markets; Contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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