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Money market funds intermediation, bank instability, and contagion

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Abstract

In recent years, U.S. banks have increasingly relied on deposits from financial intermediaries, especially money market funds (MMFs), which collect funds from large institutional investors and lend them to banks. In this paper, we show that intermediation through MMFs allows investors to limit their exposure to a given bank (i.e., reap gains from diversification). However, since MMFs are themselves subject to runs from their own investors, a banking system intermediated through MMFs is more unstable than one in which investors interact directly with banks. A mechanism through which instability can arise in an MMF-intermediated financial system is the release of private information on bank assets, which is aggregated by MMFs and could lead them to withdraw en masse from a bank. In addition, we show that MMF intermediation can also be a channel of contagion among banking institutions.

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  • Marco Cipriani & Antoine Martin & Bruno Parigi, 2013. "Money market funds intermediation, bank instability, and contagion," Staff Reports 599, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:599
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    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    2. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    3. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-574, September.
    4. Patrick E. McCabe & Marco Cipriani & Michael Holscher & Antoine Martin, 2013. "The Minimum Balance at Risk: A Proposal to Mitigate the Systemic Risks Posed by Money Market Funds," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 44(1 (Spring), pages 211-278.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tanju Yorulmazer, 2014. "Case studies on disruptions during the crisis," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Feb, pages 17-28.
    2. Anne-Marie Rieu-Foucault, 2018. "Les interventions de crise de la FED et de la BCE diffèrent-elles ?," Working Papers hal-04141702, HAL.
    3. Xiaole Tong & Jingfei Wang, 2023. "Does the Development of Money Market Funds in China Increase the Bank Liquidity Risk?," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 13(1), pages 1-7.

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    Keywords

    Intermediation (Finance); Money market funds; Bank investments; Financial crises;
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